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All Public, No Benefit: Holding Oklahoma Public Benefit 
Corporations Accountable 
I think more and more people want to use services from 





Larry Fink, BlackRock Chairman and CEO, declared that his firm will 
allocate capital investments to companies with environmentally sustainable 
business models.
2
 As the world’s largest institutional investor, BlackRock’s 
shift signals a watershed moment for corporate action on climate change.
3
 
Similarly, consumers increasingly prefer environmentally and socially 
responsible companies.
4
 A company’s long-term viability will therefore 




BlackRock’s paradigmatic shift comes amid an extraordinary movement 
in corporate law.
6
 In the past decade, Oklahoma
7
 and thirty-seven other 
                                                                                                             
 1. Facebook, Inc., Registration Statement (Form S-1), at 68 (Feb. 1, 2012), http:// 
tinyurl.com/fb-sec-reg-stmt [hereinafter Facebook Registration Statement]. 
 2. Laurence D. Fink, A Fundamental Reshaping of Finance, BLACKROCK, 
https://www.blackrock.com/us/individual/larry-fink-ceo-letter (last visited Mar. 22, 2021). 
 3. Laurel Wamsley, World’s Largest Asset Manager Puts Climate at the Center of Its 
Investment Strategy, NPR (Jan. 14, 2020, 3:22 PM ET), https://www.npr.org/2020/01/ 
14/796252481/worlds-largest-asset-manager-puts-climate-at-the-center-of-its-investment-
strate. 
 4. KARL HALLER, JIM LEE & JANE CHEUNG, IBM CORP., MEET THE 2020 CONSUMERS 
DRIVING CHANGE: WHY BRANDS MUST DELIVER ON OMNIPRESENCE, AGILITY, AND 
SUSTAINABILITY 5 (June 2020), https://www.ibm.com/downloads/cas/EXK4XKX8. 
 5. See Mark R. Kramer, Larry Fink Isn’t Going to Read Your Sustainability Report, 
HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan. 20, 2020), https://hbr.org/2020/01/larry-fink-isnt-going-to-read-your-
sustainability-report (observing that “companies that differentiate themselves through 
positive social impact are thriving” and a future where capital is increasingly allocated to 
those companies “is not far away”). 
 6. See J. Haskell Murray, Choose Your Own Master: Social Enterprise, Certifications, 
and Benefit Corporation Statutes, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 1, 4 (2012) [hereinafter Murray, 
Choose Your Own Master] (noting that many states have recently “passed statutes to 
facilitate the creation of social enterprises,” such as low-profit limited liability company 
statutes and benefit corporation statutes). 
 7. Oklahoma recently passed a public benefit corporation law, which went into effect 
on November 1, 2019. See Steve Metzer, Benefit Corporations Allowed Under New State 
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 passed statutes creating a new entity called a “public benefit 
corporation.” Where a traditional for-profit corporation’s central purpose is 
to maximize profits,
9
 public benefit corporations may pursue profits for 




The growth of public benefit corporations, however, has not been 
without criticism.
11
 Over ninety percent of existing public benefit 
corporations nationwide do not disclose mandatory statements to the public 
detailing how the board of directors pursued general and specific public 
benefits.
12
 Despite states’ widespread adoption of public benefit statutes, 
scholars warn of the entity’s futility and potential for deception.
13
 However, 
this Note argues that enacting Oklahoma’s public benefit statute is a 
significant endeavor. But if it is to capitalize on the social entrepreneurship 
movement, Oklahoma must provide its public benefit corporations with 
precise, modest, and reliable performance and communication standards. 
This Note will propose modifications to the Oklahoma Benefit 
Corporation Act. Part II will explore traditional corporate purpose standards 
and the rise of social entrepreneurship. Part III will set forth and discuss 
Oklahoma’s annual statement requirements and a public benefit 
corporation’s duty to maximize public benefits. Considering the trend of 
social and environmental entrepreneurship, investment, and consumption, 
Part IV will propose two modest amendments to Oklahoma’s law that will 
                                                                                                             
Law, J. REC. (Apr. 29, 2019), https://journalrecord.com/2019/04/29/benefit-corporations-
allowed-under-new-state-law/. 
 8. State by State Status of Legislation, BENEFIT CORP., https://benefitcorp.net/ 
policymakers/state-by-state-status (last visited Mar. 22, 2021). 
 9. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 711–12 (2014); see also Dodge 
v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) (“A business corporation is organized 
and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders.”). 
 10. 18 OKLA. STAT. § 1206(A) (Supp. 2020). 
 11. See, e.g., Elizabeth Schmidt, New Legal Structures for Social Enterprises: Designed 
for One Role but Playing Another, 43 VT. L. REV. 675, 713–19 (2018) (arguing that public 
benefit corporations cannot accomplish their goals). 
 12. J. Haskell Murray, An Early Report on Benefit Reports, 118 W. VA. L. REV. 25, 26 
(2015) [hereinafter Murray, An Early Report]. 
 13. See id.; see also Kennan El Khatib, Comment, The Harms of the Benefit 
Corporation, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 151, 174–84 (2015); Mohsen Manesh, Introducing the 
Totally Unnecessary Benefit LLC, 97 N.C. L. REV. 603, 621–24 (2019); Joan MacLeod 
Heminway, Let’s Not Give Up on Traditional For-Profit Corporations for Sustainable 
Social Enterprise, 86 UMKC L. REV. 779, 800–01 (2018); Kevin V. Tu, Socially Conscious 
Corporations and Shareholder Profit, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 121, 170–71 (2016). 
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ensure accountability and transparency. Finally, Part V will consider how 
such modifications will help Oklahoma race to the top of the social and 
environmental equity markets.  
II. Corporate Purpose and Social Entrepreneurship 
Throughout history, states have invented new business entities to 
capitalize on tax benefits and limit legal liability.
14
 Just as when legislators 
adopted limited partnership statutes to ameliorate various issues in general 
partnership law, the invention of the public benefit corporation is a direct 
response to perceived deficiencies in general corporate law.
15
 This Part 
outlines those deficiencies and how the social entrepreneurial movement 
addresses them. 
A. Traditional Corporate Purpose Requirements 
Public benefit corporations represent a return to original corporate 
governance practices.
16
 During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries, states conceptualized corporations as “quasi-public entities, 
‘designed to serve a social function for the state.’”
17
 State legislatures 
would award an exclusive corporate charter that authorized incorporation 
only if the corporation continually served the public and accounted for its 
actions.
18
 As America’s economy expanded, states substituted the exclusive 
charter system for general incorporation statutes that authorized 
                                                                                                             
 14. See Daniel S. Kleinberger, Two Decades of “Alternative Entities”: From Tax 
Rationalization Through Alphabet Soup to Contract as Deity, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. 
L. 445, 448 (2009) (highlighting the driving forces behind the limited liability company, 
limited liability partnership, and limited liability limited partnership). 
 15. See Lyman Johnson, Pluralism in Corporate Form: Corporate Law and Benefit 
Corps., 25 REGENT U. L. REV. 269, 276 (2012). 
 16. Id. at 272. 
 17. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 427 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (quoting Oscar Handlin & Mary L. Handlin, Origins of the American 
Business Corporation, 5 J. ECON. HIST. 1, 22 (1945)). 
 18. Lyman Johnson, Law and Legal Theory in the History of Corporate Responsibility: 
Corporate Personhood, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1135, 1144–45 (2012) (citing MORTON J. 
HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960, at 65–108 (1992)). 
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incorporation without a mandatory public purpose.
19
 Under these statutes, 





 limited directorial latitude to pursue any lawful 
business purpose.
22
 For example, in Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.,
23
 the 
Michigan Supreme Court commanded majority shareholder and director 
Henry Ford to contribute cash to minority shareholders instead of using the 
excess capital to benefit society.
24
 In oft-quoted dicta, the court declared 
that “[a] business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the 
profit of stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be employed for 
that end.”
25
 Directors enjoy discretion in managing business affairs, but 
directors cannot deliberately limit profits.
26
 
Despite the lofty language in Dodge, the business judgment rule limits 
the applicability of the shareholder primacy doctrine.
27
 Under the business 
judgment rule, courts presume that, in deciding business matters, corporate 
directors acted “on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief 
that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.”
28
 Shlensky v. 
Wrigley
29
 is a classic illustration of this rule. In Shlensky, minority 
shareholders sued on behalf of the Chicago Cubs to install lights at Wrigley 
                                                                                                             
 19. See Ian Speir, Corporations, the Original Understanding, and the Problem of 
Power, 10 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 115, 152 (2012). 
 20. 1 JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 
4:1 (3d ed. 2010); see also 1A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE 
LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 102 (rev. ed. 2010). 
 21. See, e.g., eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 33 (Del. Ch. 2010) 
(explaining that the defendants had failed to prove that their decision would have ultimately 
“translate[d] into increased profitability for stockholders”). 
 22. Legal scholars and economists remain deeply divided on whether shareholder 
primacy is required. For in-depth analysis, see Murray, Choose Your Own Master, supra 
note 6, at 5–9.  
 23. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). 
 24. Id. at 684–85. 
 25. Id. at 684; see also eBay, 16 A.3d at 33 (noting that the defendants had not proved 
that their decision “translates into increased profitability for stockholders”). 
 26. Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684. 
 27. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954–55, 959 (Del. 
1985) (applying the business judgment rule, wherein the court defers to the board’s decision 
if it can be attributed to a rational business purpose, and sustaining the board’s reasonable 
business judgment); Beard v. Love, 2007 OK CIV APP 118, ¶ 29, 173 P.3d 796, 804 
(describing the business judgment rule). 
 28. In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 124 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
 29. 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol73/iss4/6





 The shareholders argued that installing lights at Wrigley Field 
would boost attendance.
31
 The Chicago Cubs’ president refused to install 
lights because he believed that light pollution would deteriorate the quality 
of the surrounding neighborhood.
32
 The Illinois Court of Appeals ruled that 
the business judgment rule affords directors protection to consider non-
shareholder interests if there is a rational connection between that 
consideration and shareholder value.
33
 It further stated that courts are 
“without authority to substitute [their] judgment for that of the directors.”
34
 
With shareholder approval, traditional corporate directors support various 
philanthropic and environmental causes.
35
 Ultimately, courts rarely order 
directors to act for shareholders.
36
 
Despite traditional corporate law’s flexibility and liability protections, 
public benefit proponents insisted on a new business entity that ensured 
comprehensive liability protection and effective branding.
37
 Even though 
the business judgment rule presumes that directors act in the best interests 
of the company, critics of the shareholder primacy doctrine wanted a 
business entity that eliminated the risk of derivative litigation for placing 
profits and social benefits on equal footing.
38
 Social and environmental 
entrepreneurs also wanted a business form that mandated, rather than 
                                                                                                             
 30. Id. at 777. 
 31. Id. at 778. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See id. at 780. 
 34. Id. at 779 (quoting Helfman v. Am. Light & Traction Co., 187 A. 540, 550 (N.J. Ch. 
1936)); see also Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & 
BUS. REV. 163, 170–71 (2008) (“[C]ourts shield directors from liability under the business 
judgment rule so long as any plausible connection can be made between the directors’ 
decision and some possible future benefit, however intangible and unlikely, to 
shareholders.”). 
 35. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 712 (2014). 
 36. See Jonathan R. Macey, A Close Read of an Excellent Commentary on Dodge v. 
Ford, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 177, 180 (2008); WILLIAM T. ALLEN, REINIER KRAAKMAN & 
GUHAN SUBRAMANIAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 
298 (3d ed. 2009). 
 37. See, e.g., El Khatib, supra note 13, at 166–69. 
 38. See WILLIAM H. CLARK, JR. & LARRY VRANKA, THE NEED AND RATIONALE FOR THE 
BENEFIT CORPORATION: WHY IT IS THE LEGAL FORM THAT BEST ADDRESSES THE NEEDS OF 
SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURS, INVESTORS, AND, ULTIMATELY, THE PUBLIC 10 (Jan. 18, 2013) 
(unpublished white paper), https://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/Benefit_Corporation_ 
White_Paper.pdf. 
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 As markets grew to prefer “green” products 
and services, traditional corporations capitalized by marketing with socially 
responsible terms—without accountability measures—to lure consumers.
40
 
To prevent these issues, social and environmental entrepreneurs began 




B. The Dawn of Social Entrepreneurship 
Before the advent of the public benefit corporation in 2010, however, a 
non-profit entity tried to resolve the issues plaguing corporations by 
inventing a new certification method.
42
 In 2006, a Pennsylvania non-profit 
named B Lab created a method of certifying corporations that sufficiently 
benefited non-corporate stakeholders.
43
 To obtain this certification, a 
corporation must state in its articles of incorporation that it will consider 
non-shareholder constituencies in its decision-making processes.
44
 After 
analyzing the corporation’s historical decision-making processes, B Lab 
would certify the corporation as a “B Corp,” thus signaling to shareholders, 




Only four years after B Lab created B Corp certification, B Lab used its 
industry proficiency to craft its “Model Legislation.”
46
 The Model 
                                                                                                             
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 2–3. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations - A Sustainable Form of 
Organization?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591, 594 (2011). 
 43. For a detailed explanation of the B Corp certification process, see Ke Cao, Joel 
Gehman & Matthew G. Grimes, Standing Out and Fitting In: Charting the Emergence of 
Certified B Corporations by Industry and Region, in HYBRID VENTURES 7–9 (Andrew C. 
Corbett & Jerome A. Katz eds., 2017) (vol. 19 in the Advances in Entrepreneurship, Firm 
Emergence and Growth series). I note that B Corps and public benefit corporations are 
distinct entities. B Corps are traditional for-profit corporations that B Lab has certified. 
Public benefit corporations are legal entities formed under state law. 
 44. About Certified B Corps, CERTIFIED B CORP., https://bcorporation.net/about-b-corps 
(last visited Mar. 22, 2021); see also David Adelman, Understanding B Corporations, G & B 
L., LLP (Aug. 6, 2010), https://gblawllp.com/2010/08/06/understanding-b-corporations/ 
(describing the history of B Corps). 
 45. About Certified B Corps, supra note 44. 
 46. See BENEFIT CORP., MODEL BENEFIT CORPORATION LEGISLATION WITH 
EXPLANATORY COMMENTS (Apr. 17, 2017), https://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/ 
Model%20benefit%20corp%20legislation%20_4_17_17.pdf. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol73/iss4/6
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Legislation, which is identical to B Lab’s certification procedures blended 
with state enabling legislation, authorized the formation of a new business 
entity.
47
 With its Model Legislation finished, B Lab lobbied other states to 
adopt the public benefit corporation.
48
 
These lobbying efforts took corporate law by storm.
49
 After it drafted the 
Model Legislation, B Lab successfully petitioned Maryland to become the 
first state to pass a benefit corporation statute in 2010.
50
 Oklahoma closed 
the 2010s as the thirty-sixth state to adopt public benefit corporation 
legislation inspired by B Lab’s Model Legislation.
51
 In all states with public 
benefit corporation statutes, public benefit corporations have an express 
purpose of creating general public benefits.
52
 In most states, public benefit 
corporations must submit annual benefit reports to their shareholders and 
post them on their public websites.
53
 The annual benefit report includes 




Despite proponents’ claims of altruistic corporate purpose and 
accountability, public benefit corporations are not living up to the hype in 
three ways. First, over ninety percent of existing public benefit corporations 
do not disclose required annual statements to the public.
55
 Second, the 
language found in state statutes regarding a director’s duty to consider 
various interests lacks specificity.
56
 Third, statutes give public benefit 
corporations by and large absolute deference to create benefit performance 
standards.
57
 And like its counterparts, Oklahoma’s statute falls into similar 
traps. 
  
                                                                                                             
 47. See Reiser, supra note 42, at 594. 
 48. See Murray, Choose Your Own Master, supra note 6, at 21–22. 
 49. Cf. State by State Status of Legislation, supra note 8 (observing that thirty-seven 
states have passed benefit corporation legislation). 
 50. See Act of Apr. 13, 2010, 2010 Md. Laws 980 (codified as amended at MD. CODE 
ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS §§ 5-6C-01 to -08 (West 2020)). 
 51. See Metzer, supra note 7; see also Mark J. Loewenstein, Benefit Corporation Law, 
85 U. CIN. L. REV. 381, 381 n.1 (2017) (collecting over thirty state statutes). 
 52. Loewenstein, supra note 51, at 383. 
 53. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-08(a), (c)(1). 
 54. Id. § 5-6C-08(a)(2). 
 55. See Murray, Choose Your Own Master, supra note 6, at 26. 
 56. See, e.g., 18 OKLA. STAT. § 1207 (Supp. 2020). 
 57. See Metzer, supra note 7. 
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III. Oklahoma Benefit Corporation Act 
In November 2019, Oklahoma became the thirty-sixth state to adopt 
public benefit corporation legislation.
58
 By that time, Oklahoma had at its 
disposal almost a decade of other states’ experience. Yet Oklahoma decided 
to mirror the language of other states’ statutes.
59
 Because of this similarity, 
Oklahoma will largely encounter the same headaches as other states. 
This Part analyzes the Oklahoma Benefit Corporation Act’s 
accountability and transparency provisions. These provisions grant directors 
almost unlimited latitude to adopt benefit assessment standards and 
disclosure requirements.
60
 Due to this discretion, Oklahoma public benefit 
corporations risk permitting the very greenwashing that public benefit 
proponents sought to prevent in the first place. 
A. Accountability – Duty to Consider Various Interests 
The Oklahoma Benefit Corporation Act (OBCA), which “reflects a clear 
standard of purpose, accountability and transparency for public benefit”
61
 
requires that public benefit corporations “have a purpose of creating general 
public benefit.”
62
 Additionally, the “certificate of incorporation of a [public] 
benefit corporation may identify one or more specific public benefits” that 
it plans on pursuing.
63
 Thus, the OBCA offers public benefit corporate 
directors more latitude than directors of a traditional corporation.
64
 Like 
traditional corporations, public benefit corporate shareholders generally 
monitor the board of directors.
65
 When shareholders challenge business 
decisions in the corporate context, directors enjoy substantial protection 
under the business judgment rule.
66
 This protection might expand given the 
                                                                                                             
 58. Id. 
 59. See infra note 102. 
 60. See 18 OKLA. STAT. § 1207. 
 61. Metzer, supra note 7. 
 62. 18 OKLA. STAT. § 1206(A). 
 63. Id. § 1206(B). 
 64. See Brett H. McDonnell, Committing to Doing Good and Doing Well: Fiduciary 
Duty in Benefit Corporations, 20 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 19, 38 (2014). 
 65. See Dana Brakman Reiser, Regulating Social Enterprise, 14 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 
231, 234 (2014). 
 66. See, e.g., Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (upholding 
the board’s decision not because it was correct but because it may have furthered a business 
purpose and there was no allegation of fraud, illegality, or conflict of interest in the making 
of the decision). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol73/iss4/6
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dual purpose of the public benefit corporation.
67
 That is because where 
corporate directors must justify business decisions on the grounds of long-
term profit maximization, public benefit corporate directors can argue that 




Even with extensive legal protection, the OBCA imposes an additional 
duty on public benefit directors. Besides the duty to create a general public 
benefit, the OBCA charges directors to “consider the effects of any action 
or inaction upon” six classes of corporate and non-corporate stakeholders.
69
 
The OBCA does not define how directors are to prioritize these various 
stakeholders.
70
 Even while the OBCA tasks directors with producing 
general public benefits,
71
 directors have near absolute discretion in 
prioritizing, for example, the interests of shareholders, the public benefit 




The OBCA also does not define “consider” as used within the statute.
73
 
When a statute does not expressly define a word, courts presume the word 
has its plain or ordinary meaning.
74
 To “consider” merely involves careful 
                                                                                                             
 67. See McDonnell, supra note 64, at 61–62 (stating that directors of public benefit 
corporations may have a lesser probability of liability for certain business decisions). 
 68. See id. 
 69. 18 OKLA. STAT. § 1207(A)(1) (Supp. 2020) (emphasis added). 
 70. See id. § 1207(A)(3) (providing that the directors “[n]eed not give priority to a 
particular interest or factor . . . unless the benefit corporation has stated in its certificate of 
incorporation its intention to give priority to certain interests or factors”); J. Haskell Murray, 
Social Enterprise Innovation: Delaware’s Public Benefit Corporation Law, 4 HARV. BUS. L. 
REV. 345, 354 (2014) [hereinafter Murray, Social Enterprise Innovation]; see also Mark J. 
Loewenstein, Benefit Corporations: A Challenge in Corporate Governance, 68 BUS. LAW. 
1007, 1027–34 (2013) (discussing governance difficulties that public benefit boards of 
directors will likely face). 
 71. 18 OKLA. STAT. § 1206(A). 
 72. See id. § 1207(A)(3). 
 73. See id. § 1202 (providing definitions for key terms used within the Oklahoma Public 
Benefit Corporation Act but providing no definition for the term “consider”); see also id. § 
1207(A)(1). 
 74. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993) (“When a word is not 
defined by statute, we normally construe it in accord with its ordinary or natural meaning.”); 
I.T.K. v. Mounds Pub. Schs., 2019 OK 59, ¶ 21, 451 P.3d 125, 136; see also ANTONIN 
SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 436 (2d 
ed. 2013). 
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 Applying the plain meaning rule of statutory interpretation, 
public benefit directors need only “think about carefully”
76
 or take into 
consideration the interests of non-corporate stakeholders before deciding to 
act purely for the shareholder’s best interests. Under such a framework, if 
the minutes of a public benefit corporation’s board meeting highlighted 
some “careful thought” about the impacts on the local climate, low-income 
neighborhoods, or some other identified stakeholder, then a court would not 
question the board’s business judgment. While a director’s duty to consider 
various interests is subject to the duty of good faith,
77
 such a low decision-
making threshold contravenes the OBCA’s accountability purpose. 
B. Transparency – Annual Benefit Statements 
The OBCA also seeks to ensure that public benefit directors remain 
transparent to shareholders and stakeholders. As drafted, the OBCA departs 
from other public benefit statutes in two ways.
78
 First, directors enjoy 
significant discretion to adopt public benefit assessment standards.
79
 
Second, the OBCA does not demand public benefit corporations publish 
their annual benefit statements to the public.
80
 These departures are not 
mere technicalities; public benefit directors can set the rules of the game 
and ensure that those who they promise to serve cannot question their 
performance. On this basis, the OBCA’s transparency measures ring 
hollow. 
1. Performance Assessment Standards 
The OBCA grants public benefit directors a virtual blank check in 
adopting performance assessment standards. To be sure, public benefit 
directors must deliver an annual report to shareholders detailing the 
                                                                                                             
 75. See Consider, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ 
consider (last visited Mar. 23, 2021).  
 76. Id. 
 77. See 18 OKLA. STAT. § 867(2) (providing that directors are not shielded from liability 
for actions or omissions that are not in good faith). 
 78. See Brent J. Horton, Rising to Their Full Potential: How a Uniform Disclosure 
Regime Will Empower Benefit Corporations, 9 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 101, 106 n.26 (2019) 
(explaining that Delaware’s Benefit Corporation Law, which has similar provisions to 
Oklahoma’s, differs from the laws adopted by most states in material ways). 
 79. See 18 OKLA. STAT. § 1207(A)(1), (3).  
 80. See id. § 1210(A) (providing that benefit corporations shall give shareholders an 
annual statement concerning the “corporation’s promotion of general public benefit and any 
specific public benefit identified in the certificate of incorporation”).  
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 Besides the objectives the board adopts as its 
general public benefit, the statement must also include: “The standards the 
board of directors has adopted to measure the corporation’s progress in 
promoting general public benefit and any specific public benefit.”
82
 While 
the statement must include “[o]bjective factual information . . . regarding 
the corporation’s success in meeting the objectives,”
83
 the directors supply 
the objective information based on the standards they adopt.
84
 In essence, 
the directors set the height of the hurdle they must clear. 
States with statutes like the OBCA are witnessing widespread 
underreporting.
85
 Even those public benefit corporations that submit annual 
benefit statements provide only self-promotional and elusive information.
86
 
Consider Patagonia’s 2019 Annual Benefit Corporation Report.
87
 In that 
report, Patagonia highlighted its efforts to build its products without 
“unnecessary harm.”
88
 To be sure, much of its report highlights concrete 
benefits—fifty-two percent of its materials by weight are made of recycled 
materials.
89
 But much of its report also leans on slippery language—
reducing energy use throughout its supply chain, expanding regenerative 
organic agriculture as a source of its materials, and using innovative fleece 
blends.
90
 Perhaps Patagonia follows through on the standards set in its 
annual reports. The lack of certainty, though, undermines any assurance of 
transparency.  
To help alleviate this problem, some states require public benefit 
corporations to adopt a third-party performance assessment standard.
91
 Yet, 
a third-party standard is not an ironclad solution; a standard that adopts 




                                                                                                             
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. § 1210(A)(1)–(2). 
 83. Id. § 1210(A)(3). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Murray, An Early Report, supra note 12, at 34. 
 86. See Murray, Social Enterprise Innovation, supra note 70, at 360. 
 87. PATAGONIA, ANNUAL BENEFIT CORPORATION REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2019, 
https://www.patagonia.com/on/demandware.static/-/Library-Sites-PatagoniaShared/default/ 
dwf14ad70c/PDF-US/PAT_2019_BCorp_Report.pdf (last visited May 21, 2021). 
 88. Id. at 6. 
 89. Id. at 8.  
 90. Id. 
 91. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 304A.301(3) (West 2020). 
 92. Reiser, supra note 42, at 610–11. 
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On the other hand, states with stringent performance assessment 
standards are seeing widespread compliance.
93
 Minnesota is an insightful 
example. Minnesota requires its public benefit corporations to choose an 
independent third-party performance standard and file the statement with 
the secretary of state.
94
 The secretary of state revokes the public benefit 
corporation’s status for failure to file the statement.
95
 In its benefit 
statement, a public benefit corporation must explain “any circumstances 
that hindered efforts to pursue or create general public benefit.”
96
 Not 




2. Only Shareholder Disclosures 
When it enacted the OBCA, Oklahoma stressed that the public benefit 
designation reflects a clear standard of transparency.
98
 To that end, the 
OBCA provides: “A benefit corporation shall annually provide its 
shareholders with a statement as to the corporation’s promotion of general 
public benefit and any specific public benefit identified in the certificate of 
incorporation.”
99
 Unlike other states, Oklahoma public benefit corporations 
do not file their annual statements with the secretary of state.
100
 
As the recognized corporate law pacesetter,
101
 Delaware significantly 
influenced Oklahoma’s legislature.
102
 Neither the Delaware statute nor the 
                                                                                                             
 93. Maxime Verheyden, Public Reporting by Benefit Corporations: Importance, 
Compliance, and Recommendations, 14 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 37, 71–73 (2018). 
 94. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 304A.301(1), (3) (West 2020). 
 95. Id. § 304A.301(5). 
 96. Id. § 304A.301(3)(2)(ii)(C). 
 97. Verheyden, supra note 93, at 71–73. 
 98. Metzer, supra note 7.  
 99. 18 OKLA. STAT. § 1210(A) (Supp. 2020) (emphasis added). 
 100. Compare id., with MINN. STAT. ANN. § 304A.301(1), and MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
ch. 156E, § 16(d) (West 2020). 
 101. In re Prudential Ins. Co. Derivative Litig., 659 A.2d 961, 969 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. 
Div. 1995). 
 102. Compare 18 OKLA. STAT. § 1210(A) (“A benefit corporation shall annually provide 
its shareholders with a statement as to the corporation’s promotion of general public benefit 
and any specific public benefit identified in the certificate of incorporation.”), with DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 366(b) (West 2020) (“A public benefit corporation shall no less than 
biennially provide its stockholders with a statement as to the corporation’s promotion of the 
public benefit or public benefits identified in the certificate of incorporation and of the best 
interests of those materially affected by the corporation’s conduct.”). 
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Oklahoma rule requires public disclosures.
103
 On that basis, only eight 
percent of Delaware public benefit corporations voluntarily disclosed 
annual benefit reports to the public.
104
 Until the OBCA is modified, 
Oklahoma stakeholders will not receive benefit statements unless public 
benefit corporations voluntarily disclose them. 
Even amid widespread public benefit underreporting, Oklahoma 
deliberately chose not to require public benefit statements.
105
 The OBCA, 
as originally drafted, stated, “A benefit corporation shall post all of its 
benefit reports on the public portion of its website, if any.”
106
 The draft 
legislation also required delivery of the annual statement to the Secretary of 
State.
107
 Ultimately, Oklahoma rejected both measures.
108
 
The OBCA’s failure to identify a standard baseline will continue the 
trend of widespread underreporting and reporting of self-promotional 
information.
109
 If a public benefit board adopts objectively low standards 
and opts not to disclose its performance to the public, it will have an unfair 
advantage against other public benefit corporations that adopt higher 
standards and disclose performance.
110
 This is because the general public 
will have no way of evaluating which company in fact benefits 
stakeholders. Perhaps private ordering would be a sufficient check against 
public benefit corporations with minimal performance standards.
111
 But 
without amendments to the OBCA, consumers do not have the tools to hold 
public benefit corporations accountable to their missions. 
IV. Amendment Proposals 
Despite lofty intentions, the public benefit corporation experiment has 
produced underwhelming results. To date, fewer than 4,000 exist in the 
United States.
112
 Comparatively, over three million corporations were 
                                                                                                             
 103. See supra note 102. 
 104. Verheyden, supra note 93, at 74–75. 
 105. Murray, An Early Report, supra note 12, at 43–44. 
 106. H.B. 2423, 57th Leg., 1st Sess., at 24 (Okla. 2019). 
 107. Id. at 25. 
 108. See 18 OKLA. STAT. § 1210(A) (Supp. 2020). 
 109. See Murray, An Early Report, supra note 12, at 43–44. 
 110. See Ronnie Cohen & Gabriele Lingenfelter, Money Isn’t Everything: Why Public 
Benefit Corporations Should Be Required to Disclose Non-Financial Information, 42 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 115, 124 (2017). 
 111. See Horton, supra note 78, at 119. 
 112. Metzer, supra note 7. 
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formed in the short time period from 2004 to 2007.
113
 If Oklahoma is to 
capitalize on the burgeoning sustainability market, it must give public 
benefit directors a well-defined accountability standard and publicize 
benefit statements. This Part recommends modifications to the boards of 
directors’ duty to various interests and annual benefit statement standards. 
A. Accountability – Corporate Purpose Statement 
Public benefit corporations exist to serve stakeholders.
114
 Statutory 
ambiguity, however, allows directors to avoid serving these stakeholders. 
On the one hand, proponents of statutory ambiguity argue that the statute’s 
open-ended language leaves room for private ordering and organizational 
flexibility.
115
 These advocates reason that the public benefit statutes remain 
ambiguous to encourage market creativity, prevent a chilling effect, and 
promote widespread incorporation.
116
 Market forces, they claim, will be a 
sufficient check against public benefit corporations that fail to produce 
profits and public benefits.
117
 Accordingly, market forces will encourage 
social entrepreneurs to be innovative in creating public benefits.
118
 
But the argument for ambiguity is premised on consumers and investors 
having sufficient information to make informed decisions. Public benefit 
corporations are a newer business entity with unreliable reporting 
mechanisms.
119
 These mechanisms cannot provide accessible or valuable 
information.
120
 Without readily available information, market forces are 
inept at distinguishing between those public benefit corporations that live 
up to their clear standard of purpose and those that do not.
121
 The OBCA’s 
                                                                                                             
 113. See Rodney D. Chrisman, LLCs Are the New King of the Hill, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. 
& FIN. L. 459, 476 (2010). 
 114. Briana Cummings, Note, Benefit Corporations: How to Enforce a Mandate to 
Promote the Public Interest, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 578, 608 (2012). 
 115. See id. at 593. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id.; see also William H. Clark, Jr. & Elizabeth K. Babson, How Benefit 
Corporations Are Redefining the Purpose of Business Corporations, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. 
REV. 817, 846 (2012) (“[M]arket forces will shape the landscape of third-party standards 
utilized by benefit corporations.”). 
 119. Michael A. Hacker, Note, “Profit, People, Planet” Perverted: Holding Benefit 
Corporations Accountable to Intended Beneficiaries, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1747, 1779 (2016).  
 120. See id. 
 121. See Murray, An Early Report, supra note 12, at 34 (stating that less than ten percent 
of benefit corporations had released a benefit report). Cashless shops are an apt illustration. 
When New York City stores began rejecting cash from customers, market forces promptly 
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vague language increases learning costs, decreases consumer confidence in 
public benefit purpose, and undermines accountability.
122
 Even with greater 
legal protections, aspiring social entrepreneurs will arguably be more 
confident forming a traditional corporation rather than an untested, 
uncertain, and unreliable public benefit corporation.
123
 
Oklahoma public benefit directors are free to prioritize their firms’ 
objectives.
124
 When drafting the OBCA, Oklahoma legislators and other 
proponents emphasized clear accountability standards as a distinguishing 
feature of the new entity.
125
 Yet, public benefit directors may pursue 
shareholders’ interests at the expense of stakeholders.
126
 On the other hand, 
restricting directorial discretion could impede strategy development and 
limit public benefit maximization.
127
 This is because directors, more than 
state legislatures, are aware of the individual issues that their companies 
face.
128
 Restricting a public benefit board’s freedom to prioritize would 
hamstring its creativity in dealing with unique issues. And such restrictions 
would likely dissuade businesses from forming as public benefit 
corporations, thus minimizing public benefits. 
Listing a clear corporate purpose statement in an entity’s organizing 
documents presents a best-of-both-worlds solution. In addition to general 
incorporation requirements, public benefit certificates of incorporation need 
only “state that it is a benefit corporation.”
129
 A corporate purpose statement 
would list a public benefit corporation’s stakeholder prioritization.
130
 The 
list would put stakeholders on notice of who the public benefit corporation 
                                                                                                             
persuaded the New York City Council to ban shops from refusing cash. See Ed Shanahan & 
Jeffery C. Mays, New York City Stores Must Accept Cash, Council Says, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/23/nyregion/nyc-cashless-ban.html. 
Distinguishing between cash-friendly and cashless stores is simple. Public benefit 
corporations are less readily distinguishable. 
 122. See Murray, An Early Report, supra note 12, at 26, 42. 
 123. El Khatib, supra note 13, at 186–88 (highlighting TOMS Shoes as an illustration of 
social entrepreneurs preferring the traditional corporate form over the public benefit 
corporation). 
 124. See 18 OKLA. STAT. § 1207(A)(3) (Supp. 2020). 
 125. Metzer, supra note 7. 
 126. See Murray, An Early Report, supra note 12, at 44–45. 
 127. See Joseph W. Yockey, Does Social Enterprise Law Matter?, 66 ALA. L. REV. 767, 
802–03 (2015). 
 128. Id. 
 129. See, e.g., 18 OKLA. STAT. § 1203(A). 
 130. See Murray, Choose Your Own Master, supra note 6, at 29–30. 
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considered in its decision-making processes. Doing so would set clear 
societal expectations while also guiding directors. 
But publicly listing stakeholder prioritization could increase state 
enforcement costs. States currently struggle to enforce public benefit 
missions.
131
 However, publicizing stakeholder prioritization would signal to 
markets how the firm plans on operating. Market participants could tailor 
their expectations to the firm’s priorities, and firms could capitalize on 
market participants’ values. Even if courts rarely enforced these stakeholder 
prioritizations, an informed market that prefers socially and 




B. Transparency – Publicized Benefit Statements 
The OBCA’s failure to identify a standard baseline will arguably 
continue the trends of widespread underreporting and reporting of self-
promotional information.
133
 If a public benefit board adopts objectively low 
standards, it will have an unfair advantage against public benefit 
corporations that impose higher standards.
134
 Public benefit supporters 
highlight the value of market forces in shaping director behavior.
135
 
However, market forces cannot serve as a check against firms unless they 
have informative data based on quantitative, standardized metrics.
136
 
A public benefit corporation’s power to adopt its own assessment 
standards reveals the difficulty of enforcing the OBCA’s transparency 
requirement. Oklahoma’s deliberate choice not to mandate public benefit 
statements compounds the problem. Substantive transparency will require 
publicized benefit statements based on objective information. 
Current benefit assessment statements do not assure business 
transparency.
137
 Many benefit statements are self-promotional, unreliable, 
and inconsistent.
138
 King Arthur Flour’s report is illustrative.
139
 King Arthur 
                                                                                                             
 131. See Murray, An Early Report, supra note 12, at 33–34. 
 132. See Yockey, supra note 127, at 801–03; Murray, An Early Report, supra note 12, at 
29–30. 
 133. See Murray, An Early Report, supra note 12, at 50–51. 
 134. See Cohen & Lingenfelter, supra note 110, at 124. 
 135. Cummings, supra note 114, at 610. 
 136. See Horton, supra note 78, at 119. 
 137. See Murray, An Early Report, supra note 12, at 26. 
 138. See Murray, Social Enterprise Innovation, supra note 70, at 359–60. 
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Flour, one of the most well-known public benefit corporations, stated in its 
2018 benefit report that it rolled out a “Supplier Code of Conduct” to “hold 
suppliers accountable for social [and] environmental performance.”
140
 Like 
Patagonia, King Arthur Flour might follow through on its promises listed in 
its report. Yet, the glaring issue in the report is not performance, but prose; 
the language fails to assure consumers and stakeholders of tangible 
benefits. King Arthur Flour’s report highlights a public benefit 
corporation’s ability to use subjective language to greenwash its practices. 
Consumers and investors need impartial, clear, and accessible benefit data 
if they are to make informed decisions. 
This is especially true when an entity considers reorganizing as a public 
benefit corporation to bolster public relations in the face of criminal 
charges. Pharmaceutical juggernaut Purdue Pharma is the most notorious 
example. Beginning in the mid-2000s, dozens of states and the U.S. 
Department of Justice commenced civil and criminal investigations of 
Purdue and its billionaire owners for causing the national opioid 
epidemic.
141
 In the face of these civil and criminal investigations, Purdue 
filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on September 15, 2019.
142
 After extensive 
investigation and posturing, Purdue and the U.S. Department of Justice 
entered into an agreement.
143
 In addition to accepting responsibility for 
misconduct, the settlement agreement “will pave the way for Purdue to 
submit a plan of reorganization to the bankruptcy court that will transfer all 
of Purdue’s assets to a public benefit company, and ultimately deliver more 
than $10 billion in value to claimants and communities.”
144
 
As King Arthur Flour’s 2018 Report demonstrates, however, Purdue can 
advertise its efforts on behalf of these claimants and communities with 
                                                                                                             
 139. KING ARTHUR FLOUR, BENEFIT CORPORATION ANNUAL REPORT 2018, 
https://www.kingarthurbaking.com/sites/default/files/2019-06/2018-bcorp-report.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 30, 2021). 
 140. Id. at 5. 
 141. Jan Hoffman & Katie Benner, Purdue Pharma Pleads Guilty to Criminal Charges 
for Opioid Sales, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/21/health/ 
purdue-opioids-criminal-charges.html. 
 142. Jan Hoffman & Mary Williams Walsh, Purdue Pharma, Maker of OxyContin, Files 
for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/15/health/ 
purdue-pharma-bankruptcy-opioids-settlement.html. 
 143. See Hoffman & Benner, supra note 141. 
 144. Press Release, Purdue, Purdue Pharma Reaches Agreement with U.S. Department of 
Justice (Oct. 21, 2020), https://www.purduepharma.com/news/2020/10/21/purdue-pharma-
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minimal oversight. To be sure, Purdue’s case differs because these 
claimants have the utmost interest to obtain “free or at cost” opioid 
addiction treatment.
145
 But the blank check granted to Purdue Pharma, King 
Arthur Flour, and other public benefit corporations ensures that they may 
dress up how they are fulfilling their stated missions without actually 
following through. 
Impact-weighted financial accounts present a sensible solution. These 
accounts would standardize the language by creating line items on public 
benefit corporations’ financial statements.
146
 The impact-weighted financial 
accounts would specifically list the efforts of creating public benefits. 
These efforts would be converted to monetary values, listed on the public 
benefit corporation’s books, and disclosed to both shareholders and non-
corporate stakeholders identified in the certificate of incorporation.
147
 
The proliferation of large-scale capital markets necessitated the 
development of a standard financial accounting infrastructure.
148
 Likewise, 
the importance of intangibles like environmental sustainability, community 
involvement, and social well-being requires a reliable reporting 
framework.
149
 Modern capital and consumer markets increasingly value 
environmental and social sustainability.
150
 The annual benefit statement 
allows all public benefit corporations to adopt divergent and subjective 
reporting standards.
151
 Impact-weighted financial accounts, on the other 
hand, standardize the language firms use to communicate value creation to 
capital and consumer markets.
152
 
But impact-weighted financial accounts could present complex issues. 
For instance, it is tremendously difficult to monetize the positive impact of 
                                                                                                             
 145. Id. 
 146. See GEORGE SERAFEIM, T. ROBERT ZOCHOWSKI & JEN DOWNING, HARV. BUS. SCH., 
IMPACT-WEIGHTED FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS: THE MISSING PIECE FOR AN IMPACT ECONOMY 5 
(2019), https://www.hbs.edu/impact-weighted-accounts/Documents/Impact-Weighted-
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 149. DELPHINE GIBASSIER, MICHELLE RODRIGUE & DIANE-LAURE ARJALIÈS, ASS’N OF 
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https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol73/iss4/6
2021] NOTES 793 
 
 
King Arthur Flour’s Supplier Code of Conduct. Calculating a public benefit 
corporation’s outcome would increase information costs.
153
 Such high 
learning costs may dissuade small entrepreneurs from choosing the public 
benefit corporation form. Therefore, impact-weighted accounts centered on 
inputs—such as charitable giving, employee training, and policies—instead 
of outcomes, is a moderate middle ground. Monetizing inputs gives public 
benefit corporations of all sizes a standard language to promote their 
brands. 
Thus, Oklahoma should amend the OBCA’s annual benefit statement 
provision to require public disclosure statements that detail what percentage 
of their budget a public benefit corporation spent. In the interest of 
protecting small start-ups with few assets from larger firms, the impact-
weighted benefit statement will only list a firm’s percentage spent to create 
public benefits. Publicizing impact-weighted benefit statements will also 
increase brand awareness by highlighting how much a public benefit 
corporation spends on its stakeholders. Indeed, these disclosures capitalize 
on sustainability-oriented consumers and investors. Consumers and 
investors will also have sufficient information to act as a check against 
dishonest firms. 
V. Conclusion 
Profits and public benefits are linked.
154
 Sustainable businesses are 
outperforming non-sustainable businesses.
155
 The public benefit corporation 
is a prominent example of Oklahoma’s willingness to amend its corporate 
law to capitalize on evolving markets. Yet, Oklahoma’s law does not reflect 
clear standards of accountability, transparency, and higher corporate 
purpose. Public benefit corporations can effect change if they live up to 
their higher purpose. Modifying the OBCA to require publicly assessable 
corporate purpose statements and impact-weighted financial accounts 
ensures accountability and transparency without demanding too much from 
aspiring social entrepreneurs. 
 
Nicholas A. Muñoz 
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